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PROSECUTING THE MATERIAL SUPPORT 
OF TERRORISM: 
FEDERAL COURTS, MILITARY 








 Imagine you are the president of a newly founded country 
and your attorney general comes to you with 
recommendations for trial procedures in your budding 
democracy. She proposes that trials require the accused to 
have legal representation; that the judge and jury be 
independent from any outside influence; that the prosecution 
be required to turn over to the defense any exculpatory 
information it may have; that there be reasonable restrictions 
on the introduction of hearsay; that statements produced by 
torture or other forms of cruel treatment be disallowed; that 
the government not be allowed to force the defendant to 
incriminate herself; that the judge be allowed to dismiss the 
case if the government refuses to produce classified 
information; and that the accused be guaranteed two layers of 
review on the facts and the law by independent judges. 
Would you approve of this scheme? All of the foregoing 
requirements are now part of the military commissions 




Congress has given jurisdiction over the crime of 
providing material aid to terrorists to both federal courts and 
military commissions.
2
 Though military commissions have 
                                                          
*
  J.D. Candidate, 2011, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.S., 
Brigham Young University. 
1
  Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 1803, 
123 Stat. 2190 (2009).  
2
  18 U.S.C. § 2339A-C (2006); 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25) (2006). 
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been heavily criticized since their reintroduction in 2001,
3
 
current military commissions, as envisioned by the 2009 
MCA, now include many of the features available in federal 
criminal trials and military courts-martial.
4
 One remaining 
criticism, however, is the issue of forum shopping by the 
Executive branch.
5
 The only technical jurisdictional 
restrictions on military commissions are that U.S. citizens and 
lawful combatants, as defined by the Geneva Conventions, 
may not be prosecuted in military commissions.
6
 All others 
accused of material support of terrorism may be prosecuted 
by military commission.
7
 Thus, some have called for the U.S. 
to articulate a principled, neutral standard for assigning 
accused offenders to military commissions or federal courts.
8
 
Creating such a standard would help eliminate any undue 




 This note argues that given the recent changes in the 2009 
MCA the overall scheme for prosecuting material support of 
terrorism offenses is satisfactory (i.e., material support crimes 
should remain under the jurisdiction of both forums), but that 
the jurisdiction of military commissions over material support 
offenses should be limited to those providing material support 
to further specific acts of terrorism (as opposed to generalized 
support) and to those giving aid to terrorists or foreign 
terrorist organizations (hereinafter ―FTOs‖) in active theaters 
of war. 
                                                          
3
  Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal 
Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 Const. Comment 261, 
271-73 (2002). 
4
  See Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Norm Internalization Through Trials 
for Violations of International Law: Four Conditions for Success and 
Their Application to Trials of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 31 U. PA. J. 
INT'L L. 427, 478 (2009) (―[The 2009 MCA] [adjusts] discovery, 
classified information and hearsay rules to approximate those used in the 
federal courts.‖). 
5
   Id. at 479. 
6
   10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, 948c (2006). 
7
   Id. 
8
   See, e.g., Padmanabhan, supra note 4, at 479. 
9
   Id. at 478-79. 
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This approach allows for the use of military commissions, 
which may be needed in light of substantial security 
concerns,
10
 but provides clear guidance for the use of military 
commissions in the prosecution of material support crimes. 
U.S. citizens and lawful combatants are of course guaranteed 
to be prosecuted in federal court or military courts-martial, 
respectively, as the MCA excludes lawful combatants from 
military commission jurisdiction. But there remains a large 
middle ground because of the broad extraterritorial 
application of the federal material support statutes and the 
broad jurisdiction of military commissions. This note 
provides a solution for separating this middle ground in the 
context of material support offenses.  
 Part II explains the material support offenses in the 
context of federal criminal trials and military commissions. It 
provides information about the history and development of 
military commissions since 2001, and a brief overview of 
military commissions after the enactment of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (―2006 MCA‖). Part III outlines 
why the jurisdiction of military commissions over material 
support crimes should be circumscribed, even though the 
overall scheme of military commissions is generally 
satisfactory in light of the 2009 MCA. Part III also provides a 
detailed description of changes made to military commissions 
under the 2009 MCA as there has been little commentary 
about military commissions since its enactment. Part III helps 
remedy this lack of commentary. Some weaknesses of past 
commissions are noted for the sake of discussion and context, 
but this note is not intended to be a criticism or review of past 
practices as there is ample literature reviewing the pre-2009 
MCA military commissions. Finally, Part IV touches on why 
the government should take action to further the legitimacy 
and perception of fairness of military commissions. 
                                                          
10
  Scott L. Silliman, Prosecuting Alleged Terrorists by Military 
Commission: A Prudent Option, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 289, 294 
(2009). 
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II. MATERIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISM IN FEDERAL COURTS 
AND MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
A. Article III Courts 
 The first material support statute was enacted in 1994 
after the attempted bombing of the World Trade Center in 
New York in 1993.
11
 Congress has since expanded the scope 
of terrorism-related crimes by prohibiting four different types 
of material support of terrorism, which are essentially crimes 
of facilitation, in 18 U.S.C. §§2339A-D.
12
 Material support 
statutes are unique because they do not require proof of an 
individual‘s involvement in a specific terrorist offense.
13
  
Section 2339B for example, only requires that an individual 
knowingly give assistance to a terrorist organization. She is 
not required to know the specific manner in which the 
assistance will be used or even that a specific act of terrorism 
will be carried out.
14
 The defendant must only know that the 
relevant organization has been designated as an FTO by the 




The Department of Justice has had considerable success 
prosecuting violations of the material support statutes.
16
 A 
group accused of plotting to blow up the Sears Tower and 
several federal buildings in  Miami, the ―Liberty City Six‖ 
(originally known as the ―Liberty City Seven‖), was 
prosecuted under material support, seditious conspiracy, and 
                                                          
11
  Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support 
Laws And The Demands Of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEG. 1, 12 (2005) 
[hereinafter ―Chesney Sleeper Scenario‖]. 
12
  Benjamin J. Priester, Who Is a ―Terrorist‖? Drawing the Line 
Between Criminal Defendants and Military Enemies, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 
1255, 1265 (2008). 
13
  Id. 
14
  Id. at 1266. 
15
  Id.  
16
  RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS 
FIRST, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS—2009 UPDATE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 14-16 
(2009) [hereinafter In Pursuit of Justice]. 
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felony explosives statutes.
17
 The prosecutors were able to 
obtain convictions against five of the six defendants under the 
material support statutes, §§ 2339A & 2339B.
18
 However, 
only one of the six defendants was convicted on a seditious 




1. The Statutory Law 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A, enacted in 1994, specifically 
prohibits ―provid[ing] material support or resources [to 
others] . . . knowing or intending that they are to be used in 
preparation for, or in carrying out‖ terrorist acts such as the 
destruction of an airplane or the murder of government 
officers.
20
 Material support or resources are defined broadly 
as any kind of financial assistance or services, property 
(tangible or intangible), lodging, weapons, lethal substances, 
explosives,  personnel (which can include the offender), false 
identifications, communications equipment, safehouses or 
other facilities, transportation, and training or expert advice.
21
 
Medicine and religious materials are specifically excluded.
22
 
This definition applies broadly and would cover so-called 
―sleeper cells,‖ those running jihad training camps in the 
U.S., and ―individuals providing broadcasting services for a 
terrorist organization‘s television station.‖
23
 Section 2339A is 
similar to an aiding and abetting statute in that it prohibits 
giving any kind of assistance to those carrying out specific 
criminal acts (in this case terrorist acts).
24
  
In the wake of the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah 
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Congress enacted 18 
                                                          
17
  Id. at 14-15. See United States v. Batiste, No. 06-20373 (S.D. Fla. 
2009) (Dkt. Nos. 1291-96); United States v. Batiste, No. 06-20373, 2006 
WL 5350692 (S.D. Fla. 2006). 
18
  IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 14-15. 
19
  Id. United States v. Batiste, No. 06-20373, 2007 WL 5303053 
(S.D. Fla. 2009). 
20
  18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2006). 
21
  18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1) (2006). 
22
  Id. 
23
  IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 13-14. 
24
  Id. at 13; Chesney Sleeper Scenario, supra note 11, at 13. 
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U.S.C. § 2339B as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter ―AEDPA‖) to expand 
the tools of federal prosecutors against terrorism financing 
and other forms of assistance.
25
  While § 2339A can be a 
powerful statute in some circumstances,
26
 Congress may have 
seen the difficulties involved in proving whether an offender 
knew or intended that the aid was to be used in a specific 
terrorist act. Thus, section 2339B expands on § 2339A by 
prohibiting the same types of material support (financing, 
personnel, training, etc.).
27
 Instead of prohibiting the 
provision of support to further specific acts of terrorism as § 
2339A does, § 2339B prohibits providing such support to 
―foreign terrorist organization[s].‖
28
 An organization is 
designated as an FTO by the Secretary of State under the 
authority of 8 U.S.C. § 1189 when the Secretary finds that the 
organization has engaged in terrorist activity and is a threat to 
the United States.
29
 The statute only requires that an offender 
know that the group for which the support is intended has 




Section 2339B has been an important tool in prosecuting 
terrorists and those that support them.
31
 One highly visible 
case involved Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri. He was charged in 
federal court shortly after 9/11 with credit card fraud and 
                                                          
25
  James. J. Ward, The Root of All Evil: Expanding Criminal 
Liability for Providing Material Support to Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 471, 477 (2008). 
26
  See, e.g., Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, 
and the Preventative Detention Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 690 
(2009) [hereinafter Chesney Detention Debate] (describing the 
prosecution of Hamid Hayat under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A). 
27
  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g)(4) (2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)). 
28
  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). (Section 2339B also provides for 
civil penalties on top of the criminal penalties.); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(b) 
(2006). 
29
  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2000). 
30
  Id. 
31
  IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 13-15. 
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lying to a federal agent.
32
 In 2003, he was transferred to a 
naval brig in South Carolina and held as an ―enemy 
combatant‖ without charges.
33
 In February 2009 he was 
transferred back to the federal criminal system and charged 
with conspiracy to provide material support to an FTO, under 
§ 2339B.
34
 A few months later he pled guilty to conspiracy to 
violate § 2339B.
35
 He ―admitted having attended terrorist 
training camps from 1998 to 2001 and taking courses in the 
‗use of various weapons and basic operational security 
tradecraft‘‖ as well as to having met ―with Khalid Shaikh 
Mohammed, who was at the time the external operations 




Although § 2339B was not used until 2002,
37
 eighty-three 
defendants were charged under § 2339B between September 
12, 2001 and June 6, 2009 for offenses involving al-Qaeda or 
other Islamist extremist groups and any associated 
activities.
38
 Of these eighty-three cases, sixty-nine have been 
resolved, and forty defendants were convicted.
39
 By 
comparison, sixty defendants were charged under § 2339A, 




In 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 2339C was enacted to implement the 
United States‘ obligations under the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
41
 As the 
                                                          
32
  Id. at 14; Human Rights First, In The Courts, Ali Kahlah al-Marri, 
Qatari Student, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law 
/inthecourts/supreme_court_al_marri.aspx. 
33
  IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, at 14. 
34
  Id. at 14. 
35
  Id.  
36
  John Schwartz, Plea Deal Reached with Agent for Al Qaeda, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/us/01marri.html. 
37
  Brian P. Comerford, Preventing Terrorism by Prosecuting 
Material Support, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 723, 725 (2005). 
38
  IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra note 16, preface, 12. 
39
  Id.  
40
  Id.  
41
  See International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000). 
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name suggests, the convention‘s purpose was for ―signatory 
states to enact formidable and effective positive law 
prohibiting the direct or indirect financing of terrorism.‖
42
 
Section 2339C punishes an individual who ―directly or 
indirectly . . . provides or collects funds with the intention 
that such funds be used, or with the knowledge that such 
funds are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out 
[any terrorist acts].‖
43
 Like § 2339B, it is significant that 
under § 2339C ―the knowing provision of funds intended to 
finance terrorists or FTOs is a federal crime regardless of 
whether the funds in question ever in fact finance a terrorist 
act.‖
44
 Only the intent to support terrorist acts and the act of 
provision or collection of funds matters.  
Lastly, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339D in 2004 to 
punish an individual who receives ―military-type training‖ 
from an FTO, but does not provide any assistance to 
terrorists.
45
 The definition of  ―‗military-type training‘ 
includes training in means or methods that can cause death or 
serious bodily injury, destroy or damage property, or disrupt 
services to critical infrastructure, or training on the use, 
storage, production, or assembly of any explosive, firearm or 
other weapon, including any weapon of mass destruction.‖
46
 
Similar to § 2339B, this section only requires knowledge of 
the identity of the organization and its designation as an FTO 
or its involvement in terrorism.
47
 No commission of terrorist 
acts is required.
48
 Because § 2339C and § 2339D are 
                                                          
42
  Alexander J. Urbelis, Rethinking Extraterritorial Prosecution in 
the War on Terror: Examining the Unintentional yet Foreseeable 
Consequences of Extraterritorially Criminalizing the Provision of 
Material Support to Terrorists and Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 22 
CONN. J. INT‘L L. 313, 316 (2007). 
43
  18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1) (2006). 
44
  Urbelis, supra note 42, at 317; 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(3) (2006). 
45
  18 U.S.C. § 2339D(a) (2006).  
46
  18 U.S.C. § 2339D(c)(1) (2006). 
47
  18 U.S.C. § 2339D(a) (2006). 
48
  Id. 
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2. Extraterritorial Application 
Section 2339A, which prohibits the provision of material 
support in furtherance of specific terrorist acts such as murder 
and destroying an airliner,
50
 did not apply extraterritorially 
when first enacted. However, after 9/11 Congress amended § 
2339A in the 2001 Patriot Act to apply extraterritorially by 
changing the language of the statute from ―Whoever, within 
the United States provides‖ to ―Whoever provides . . . .‖
51
 As 
there are no other restrictions on this section‘s extraterritorial 
application, § 2339A is the broadest of the four.   
Section 2339B, which prohibits the provision of material 
support to FTOs, also did not apply extraterritorially when 
first enacted.
52
 But it was amended in 2004 and now clearly 
applies extraterritorially under specified circumstances.
53
 The 
statute applies extraterritorially when the offender is a U.S. 
national or permanent resident, is a stateless person habitually 
residing in the U.S., or is later brought into or found within 
the U.S. (even if the offense occurs outside the U.S.).
54
 
Moreover, the statute applies to an offender that aids or abets 
or conspires to provide material support to an FTO with any 
person over whom jurisdiction exists under § 2339B(d)(1).
55
 
The prohibition on the collection or provision of funds 
(hereinafter ―financing crime‖ or ―financing offense‖) to 
support terrorist acts in § 2339C also has broad 
extraterritorial application, which is provided for in 
considerable detail.
56
 When the financing offense takes place 
                                                          
49
  Urbelis, supra note 42, at 318. See Chesney Detention Debate, 
supra note 26, at 689 (provides the description of a case involving 
2339D). 
50
  Urbelis, supra note 42, at 315. 
51
  Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006). 
52
  Urbelis, supra note 42, at 315-16. 
53
  18 U.S.C. § 2339B(d) (2006). 
54
  Id. 
55
  Id. 
56
  18 U.S.C. § 2339C(b)(1) (2006). 
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within the United States, but the perpetrator is not found in 
the U.S. or is not a U.S. citizen, he or she may still be 
prosecuted.
57
 Specifically, jurisdiction exists if an individual 
commits a financing offense within the United States and: 
 
(A) a perpetrator was a national of another 
state or a stateless person;  
(B) on board a vessel flying the flag of another 
state or an aircraft which is registered under 
the laws of another state at the time the 
offense is committed;  
(C) on board an aircraft which is operated by 
the government of another state;  
(D) a perpetrator is found outside the United 
States;  
(E) was directed toward or resulted in the 
carrying out of a predicate act against—  
(i) a national of another state; or  
(ii) another state or a government 
facility of such state, including its 
embassy or other diplomatic or 
consular premises of that state;  
(F) was directed toward or resulted in the 
carrying out of a predicate act committed in an 
attempt to compel another state or 
international organization to do or abstain 
from doing any act; or  
(G) was directed toward or resulted in the 
carrying out of a predicate act— (i) outside the 
United States; or (ii) within the United States, 
and either the offense or the predicate act was 
conducted in, or the results thereof affected, 




                                                          
57
  Id. 
58
  18 U.S.C. § 2339C(b)(1) (2006). 
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That the United States may prosecute offenders when the 
financing offense occurs within its territory and the predicate 
terrorist occurs somewhere else is uncontroversial.
59
  
Moreover, jurisdiction exists when a financing offense 
takes place outside the United States and:  
 
(A) [the] perpetrator is a national of the United 
States or is a stateless person whose habitual 
residence is in the United States;  
(B) [the] perpetrator is found in the United 
States; or  
(C) [the financing] was directed toward or 
resulted in the carrying out of a predicate act 
against— 
(i) any property that is owned, leased, 
or used by the United States or by any 
department or agency of the United 
States, including an embassy or other 
diplomatic or consular premises of the 
United States;  
(ii) any person or property within the 
United States;  
(iii) any national of the United States 
or the property of such national; or (iv) 
any property of any legal entity 
organized under the laws of the United 
States, including any of its States, 





Additionally, an offender may be prosecuted whenever the 
financing offense is committed on board a vessel or aircraft 
registered in the U.S., on board an aircraft operated by the 
U.S., or the offense was intended to support a terrorist act 
aiming ―to compel the United States to do or abstain from 
                                                          
59
  Urbelis, supra note 42, at 318. 
60
  18 U.S.C. § 2339C(b)(2) (2006). 
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doing any act.‖
61
 Again, jurisdiction exists under § 2339C 
whether the predicate terrorist act actually occurs or not.
62
 
 Section 2339D, which prohibits the receipt of military-
style training, applies extraterritorially when the offender is a 
U.S. national or permanent resident, is a stateless person 
habitually residing in the U.S., is later brought into or found 
within the U.S. (even if the offense occurs outside the U.S.), 
or aids or abets or conspires to receive military-style training 
with any person over whom jurisdiction exists under section 
2339D(b).
63
 There is also federal jurisdiction when the 




B. Military Commissions 
 In addition to federal criminal trials involving material 
support statutes, Congress has given jurisdiction over 
material support offenses to military commissions.
65
 A brief 
history of military commissions and a detailed account of 
their use in World War II are included here to give context 
and background to the current military commission scheme. 
Also of note are the differences in public reaction to similar 
military commission schemes and the reasons behind these 
differing reactions. 
1. Historical Use 
The first known use of military commissions (previously 
known as military tribunals or war councils) by the U.S. 
government was in the U.S.-Mexico War between 1846 and 
1848.
66
 Later, the use of military commissions during the 
Civil War spurred a famous Supreme Court decision: Ex 
                                                          
61
  18 U.S.C. § 2339C(b)(3)-(5) (2006). 
62
  18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(3) (2006). 
63
  18 U.S.C. § 2339D(b) (2006). 
64
  Id. 
65
  10 U.S.C. §§ 948d, 950t(25) (2006). 
66
  Jennifer K. Elsea, Terrorism and the Law of War: Trying 
Terrorists as War Criminals before Military, Congressional Research 
Service, Congressional Research Service at CRS-18 (Dec. 11, 2001), 
available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31191.pdf. 
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Parte Milligan.
67
 They were used again in World War I and 
World War II.
68
 Perhaps the most famous use of military 
commissions was by President Roosevelt to prosecute the 
Nazi saboteurs in 1942.
69
  
Approximately six months after Hitler declared war on 
the U.S., a group of eight Nazi agents, all of which had 
previously lived in the U.S. and two of which were 
naturalized U.S. citizens, travelled to America by submarine 
and landed surreptitiously on the beaches of New York and 
Florida. Their objective was to ―to blow up aluminum plants, 
railroad lines, canal locks, hydroelectric plants, and 
bridges.‖
70
 Soon after arriving, however, two of the agents 
turned themselves in and betrayed the remaining would-be 
saboteurs to the FBI.
71
 
After J. Edgar Hoover announced their capture, there was 
a public outcry for their trial and execution.
72
 Despite some 
doubt in the Justice Department about the legality of the 
death penalty for non-U.S. citizens, the rest of the 
government, including many members of Congress, pressed 
for execution.
73
 Soon thereafter, President Roosevelt 
announced that the Nazi saboteurs would be tried by military 
commission because of its ―greater flexibility, its traditional 
use in cases of this character[,] its clear power to impose the 
death penalty,‖ and its speed and efficacy.
74
 Less than one 




                                                          
67
  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Elsea, supra note 66, at 19-
21. 
68
  Elsea, supra note 66, at 21-23. 
69
  Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 270-71. 
70
  Id. at 263. 
71
  Id. 
72
  Id. 
73
  Id. at 264. 
74
  Id. at 264-65 (―Roosevelt's announcement that a Military 
Commission would try the saboteurs ‗met with general satisfaction in 
Washington, as it will throughout the country,‘ wrote Lewis Wood, the 
New York Times Washington correspondent. ‗The Presidential action 
calmed the fears of many who realized the delays and technicalities 
incident to civil trials.‘‖). 
75
  Id. at 266. 
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The trial was closed to the public and press; and other 
than photographs and periodic communiqués that contained 
no meaningful information, it was conducted in complete 
secrecy.
76
 The President‘s order establishing the commission 
only gave a very general outline of the commission‘s 
structure.
77
 It simply gave the commission the power to make 
procedural rules consistent with the ―Articles of War,‖ to 
conduct a fair trial, to allow evidence of probative value to a 
reasonable man to be admitted, and to permit convictions 
upon a two-thirds vote (of the jury).
78
 Despite some 
complaints about the secrecy of the commission, many did 
not object to it.
79
 
Three weeks into the trial, and despite some resulting 
opposition, the Supreme Court decided to hear ―the 
saboteur‘s habeas corpus petitions challenging the legality of 
the military commissions.‖
80
 A few days later, the Supreme 
Court approved of the military commissions, but said that it 
would provide an opinion with its reasons for doing so at a 
later date.
81
 After the fact, the Court‘s quick decision was 
praised: ―But by the fact of their intercession the justices of 
America's highest court reaffirmed to innocent Americans 
that the law still stands as a shield over them, against 
malicious usurpation or the quick tempers and brash 
judgments of war time.‖
82
 
Three days after the Supreme Court‘s decision, the Nazi 
saboteurs were convicted and sentenced to death.
83
 The result 
was not publicly announced until five days later, giving the 
president a chance to review and approve the commission‘s 
judgments.
84
 President Roosevelt commuted the sentences of 
two defendants to life and thirty years, respectively, but ―[b]y 
                                                          
76
  Id. 
77
  Id. at 265 n.15. 
78
  Id. 
79
  Id. at 266. 
80
  Id. 
81
  Id. at 267. 
82
  Id. at 268. 
83
  Id. at 269. 
84
  Id. 
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the time of the public announcement, the executions [of the 
others] had been carried out.‖
85
 
About three months later, the Court released its opinion in 
Ex Parte Quirin
86
 with ―little fanfare.‖
87
 The Court deemed 
the use of military commissions acceptable in this case 
because Congress had authorized the use of military 
commissions to try violations of the laws of war, ―and that at 
least some of the acts allegedly committed by the defendants 
constituted such violations.‖
88
 It distinguished the most 
relevant precedent, Ex Parte Milligan,
89
 which said that U.S. 
citizens cannot be tried by military commission when federal 
courts are operating, by noting that the defendant in Milligan 
was not an enemy belligerent, but that the Nazi saboteurs 
were.
90
 Interestingly, there was little to no commentary about 
the opinion in the press.
91
  
Military commissions were not used after World War II 
until 2001,
92
 when President George W. Bush reintroduced 
them by military order to prosecute acts of terrorism as 
violations of the law of war.
93
 The military order did not 
specify many detailed procedures, but it had a few notable 
features. The standard for admitting evidence was simply that 
of having ―probative value to a reasonable person.‖
94
 
Conviction and sentencing for death sentences only required 
a two-thirds vote.
95
 No courts, whether foreign, international, 
                                                          
85
  Id. 
86
  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
87
  Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 270-71. 
88
  Id. at 270. 
89
  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
90
  Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 270. 
91
  Id. at 271. 
92
  Sarah Lorr, Note, Reconciling Classified Evidence and a 
Petitioner's Right to a ―Meaningful Review‖ at Guantánamo Bay: A 
Legislative Solution, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2714 (2009). 
93
  See Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain 
Non-citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,381, 57,384, 
§ 4 (Nov. 16, 2001); Elsea, supra note 66, at 1. 
94
  David Glazier, A Self-Inflicted Wound: A Half-Dozen Years of 
Turmoil Over the Guantánamo Military Commissions, 12 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 131, 148 (2008). 
95
  Id. 
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or U.S., could review the trials.
96
 Only the President or 
Secretary of Defense was authorized to conduct a review.
97
 
This is especially interesting given that the Supreme Court 
decided to review the legality of the Nazi saboteur trial 
despite FDR‘s order to the contrary.
98
 Notwithstanding the 
―seeming similarity‖ of President Bush‘s 2001 Military Order 
and that given by President Roosevelt, President Bush‘s order 
received widespread criticism from the press, Congress, legal 
academy, and foreign governments as an ―ero[sion] of . . . the 
rule of law . . . a civil liberties calamity . . . [and a] 
constitutionally questionable endeavor [that] is misguided.‖
99
 
There are a number of potential reasons for the differing 
reactions to the use of military commissions by FDR and 
President Bush. Americans have grown distrustful of 
Executive and military authority over the past sixty years 
because of events like Watergate.
100
 The country perceived a 
much greater threat to the nation‘s security during World War 
II than after 9/11.
101
 There has also been a remarkable 
expansion of federal constitutional rights in our legal system.
 
102
 Sixty years ago, criminal defendants did not have the right 
to court-provided counsel, the exclusionary rule for 
improperly obtained evidence had not yet come about, and 
habeas corpus review was much more limited.
103
 Major 
reforms for military justice also did not come until the 
passage of the Uniform Military Code in 1968.
104
 Given such 
differences, the rules contemplated by President Bush 
probably would not have drawn much attention in the late 




                                                          
96
  Id. 
97
  Id. 
98
  Id. 
99
  Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 271-74. 
100
 Id. at 281-82. 
101
  Id. at 280-81. 
102
  Id. at 280-89. 
103
  Id. at 283. 
104
  Id. at 283-84. 
105
  Id. at 280-89. 
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2. Modern Military Commissions 
 Since 2001, significant changes have been made to the 
military commissions system. This section will discuss the 
basics of military commissions and key aspects of the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006 (hereinafter ―2006 
MCA‖).  
The 2006 MCA authorized the prosecution of the 
provision of material support to terrorists by military 
commission.
106
 18 U.S.C §§ 2339A and 2339B were 
essentially merged into one in 10 U.S.C. § 950t(25), which 
prohibits the ―provision of material support or resources to be 
used in carrying out an act of terrorism or the provision of 
material support or resources to an international terrorist 
organization engaged in hostilities against the United States, 
knowing that such organization has engaged or engages in 
terrorism.‖
107
 The 2006 MCA gave military commissions 
jurisdiction over ―unlawful enemy combatants‖ (this label 
was changed to ―unprivileged enemy belligerents‖ in the 
2009 MCA).
108
 An unlawful enemy combatant is defined in 
the 2006 MCA as an individual who ―engaged in hostilities or 
who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities 
against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a 
lawful enemy combatant (including a person who is part of 
the Taliban, al Qaeda, or associated forces).‖
109
 
                                                          
106
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 
948d, 950t(25) (2006) (President Bush‘s second instruction order on 
military commissions authorized the prosecution of ―aiding the enemy‖ 
and ―aiding and abetting‖ crimes, both of which are similar to material 
support crimes.). 
107
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 
950t(25), 120 Stat. 2630 (2006). The definition of material support is 
provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006) (financial resources, personnel, 
weapons, etc.).  Id. 
108
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 948d; 
120 Stat. 2601-02; 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006). 
109
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 § 948a, 
120 Stat. 2601-02 (2006). Under the 2006 MCA, an unlawful enemy 
combatant could also be designated as such by a Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal or other executive branch tribunal. This aspect has been 
removed in the 2009 MCA. See 10 U.S.C. § 948a. 
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The 2006 MCA made some key changes in military 
commissions. First, it bifurcated the finding of facts and law 
by requiring that only the military judge presiding over the 
military commission rule on questions of law.
110
 Before the 
2006 MCA, the entire commission, usually consisting of 
three or more officers, ruled cooperatively on questions of 
law, even though the other members of the commission were 
not required to have any legal training.
111
 Furthermore, the 
presiding officer was only required to be a judge advocate, 
and did not necessarily have to be qualified as a military 
judge.
112
 The 2006 MCA required that the presiding officer 
be qualified as a military judge.
113
 Before the 2006 MCA, the 
entire commission also ruled on findings of fact.
114
 Now, 
fact-finding is assigned to the members, the jury.
115
  
Second, the 2006 MCA required that judges, trial and 
defense attorneys (the ―prosecutor‖ in military commissions 
is called the trial attorney), and the members be independent 
from any unlawful influence.
116
 Essentially, these three 
groups are insulated from any kind of evaluation or 
reprimand by senior officers or Executive branch officials.
117
 
This allows the judge to make truly impartial decisions 
without fear of retribution by superior officers, allows 
members to make impartial decisions, and allows for zealous 
representation by the defense attorneys. 
Third, the required minimum number of members was 
raised to five for non-capital offenses, and twelve for capital 
offenses and the decision to convict in capital trials had to be 
                                                          
110
  Eun Young Choi, Veritas, Not Vengeance: An Examination of the 
Evidentiary Rules for Military Commissions in the War Against 
Terrorism, 42 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 139, 151-53 (2007). 
111
  Id. 
112
  Id. 
113
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 
948j(b), 120 Stat. 2604 (2006). 
114
  Choi, supra note 110. 
115
  Id. 
116
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 
948j(f), 949b, 120 Stat. 2604, 2609-10 (2006). 
117
  Military Commissions Act of 2006 , Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 
948j(f), 120 Stat. 2604 (2006). 
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unanimous.
118
 Previously, only three members were required 
for non-capital trials, and in all cases, capital or non-capital, 
only a two-thirds vote was required to convict.
119
 
Fourth, the 2006 MCA provided for review by a panel of 
three judges from the U.S. Court of Military Commission 
Review (hereinafter ―CMCR‖).
120
 The accused was given the 
automatic right to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit.
121
 Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court could make 
a final review by writ of certiorari.
122
 However, the scope of 
review for the CMCR and D.C. Circuit was limited. The 
CMCR was only permitted to review matters of law, not 
fact.
123
 The D.C. Circuit was limited to ―considering whether 
the result was consistent with the MCA and ‗to the extent 




Fifth, Congress permitted the Secretary of Defense to 
create detailed rules of evidence and procedure.
125
 With the 
promulgation of the Manual for Military Commissions,
126
 the 
                                                          
118
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 949m, 
120 Stat. 2616-17 (2006); Choi, supra note 110.  Note in capital cases, the 
required number of members may be lowered to nine because of ―physical 
conditions or military exigencies.‖ 
119
  Glazier, supra note 94, at 148, 175; Silliman, supra note 10, at 
295 n.28 (―[A] military commission may convict a detainee, except for 
death cases, upon a vote of only two-thirds of the panel. Sentencing 
requires only a two-thirds vote for imprisonment up to ten years and a 
three-fourths vote for sentences which are more than ten years up to life 
imprisonment, but a unanimous vote is required for a death sentence and 
the jury panel must be comprised of twelve members. This is identical to 
what is required in courts-martial under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.‖ (citations omitted)). 
120
  10 U.S.C. § 950f (2006). 
121
  Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas 
Corpus, and the Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT‘L L. 322, 330 
(2007). 
122
  10 U.S.C. § 950g(e) (2006). 
123
  Glazier, supra note 94, at 176; Military Commissions Act of 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 949a 120 Stat. 2601-02 (2006). 
124
  Glazier, supra note 94, at 176. 
125
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 § 
949a(a), 120 Stat. 2608-09 (2006). 
126
  See generally Dept. of Def., Manual for Military Commissions, 
available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/M 
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evidentiary rules for military commissions, for example, were 
made quite similar to the Military Rules of Evidence (the 
rules of evidence used in Military courts-martial, which are 
very similar to the Federal Rules of Evidence).
127
 The 2009 
MCA has further closed this gap. 
Lastly, the 2006 MCA gave the accused the right to be 
present in all proceedings unless his own misconduct required 
his exclusion.
128
 Congress also ―[drew] the line on secret 
evidence, restricting trial panels to hearing only evidence that 
the accused also heard, and assuring his right to be present 
unless excluded due to his own misconduct.‖
129
 Of course, 
other problems remained because the 2006 MCA had some 
questionable provisions. Many of these were addressed in the 
2009 MCA. 
III. CIRCUMSCRIBING THE JURISDICTION OF MILITARY 
COMMISSIONS FOR MATERIAL SUPPORT CRIMES 
The military commissions introduced by President Bush 
in 2001 were heavily criticized by many,
 130
 but today‘s 
military commissions only share a name with those of the 
2001-2005 period. The 2006 MCA significantly changed 
military commissions and provided many procedural 
protections for the accused.
131
 The 2009 MCA has made even 
more significant changes. In light of the 2009 MCA, this note 




  Victor Hansen, The Usefulness of a Negative Example: What We 
Can Learn About Evidence Rules from the Government's Most Recent 
Efforts to Construct a Military Commissions Process, 35 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 1480, 1497 (2009). 
128
  Bradley, supra note 121, at 330. 
129
  Glazier, supra note 94, at 175. 
130
  See David Glazier, Playing by The Rules: Combating Al Qaeda 
Within the Law of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 1032 (2009) (―The 
Guantanamo military commissions have generated tremendous 
controversy since President Bush first authorized their use in November 
2001, largely because they were intended to take deliberate shortcuts from 
the procedural due process provided by civilian courts and courts-
martial.‖). 
131
  See supra Part II.B.2. 
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asserts that military commissions now constitute a fair and 
sensible forum for prosecuting unprivileged enemy 
belligerents. One remaining criticism of military 
commissions, however, is that there is no clear dividing line 
between military commissions and federal criminal court.
132
 
At the very least the standards for choosing a forum are not 
public and appear to allow the executive to ―forum shop‖ to 
avoid the rigors of a federal criminal trial whenever he 
chooses.
133
 This criticism is a valid one, especially from the 
standpoint that the problem undermines the credibility of the 
U.S. in the rest of the world, which may substantially 




To address this problem, either Congress or the Executive 
branch should create a principled, neutral way of assigning 
accused criminals to military commissions or federal 
courts.
135
 This note, being limited to a discussion of material 
support offenses, proposes limiting the jurisdiction of military 
commissions over material support crimes to individuals who 
intend to further specific acts of terrorism (and have actual 
knowledge, or should reasonably know of a specific 
(planned) act of terrorism) in any area of the world and to 
those giving generalized or specific aid to terrorists or FTOs 
in active theaters of war. Generalized aid being where a 
donor does not know of (or should not reasonably know of) 
or intend to further specific acts of terrorism, but only has 
knowledge that an organization or individual generally 
                                                          
132
  Padmanabhan, supra note 4, at 479. 
133
  See Michael A. Newton, Some Observations on the Future of U.S. 
Military Commissions, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 151, 162 (2008) 
(―Conversely, if the guidelines for allocating jurisdiction are opaque to the 
public and to defendants, the Administration will be criticized for its lack 
of transparency and the appearance of selective and self-serving justice.‖). 
134
  See infra Part IV. 
135
  Newton, supra note 133 (―This puts the premium on the executive 
branch to promulgate clear guidance to military commanders and the 
Department of Justice as to the decision-making process for allocating 
jurisdiction among potential forums. This process must of necessity walk 
a very fine line in order to prevent trials from being tainted by executive 
interference or wholly improper command influence emanating from the 
White House or its designated proxies.‖). 
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engages in acts of terrorism. Also note that the terms aid, 
support, and material support are used interchangeably.  
This section outlines why a line should be drawn between 
generalized and specific material support, and between active 
theaters of war and the rest of the world. It also provides a 
detailed description of important military commission 
procedures because little has been written about the new—
and significant—changes made by the 2009 MCA. Despite 
military commissions not being identical to Article III Courts, 
they provide a viable and fair forum to the Executive branch 
to prosecute terror-related offenses.
136
 
A. Drawing Lines 
1. Specific vs. General Support 
The first distinction made herein is between generalized 
material support given to terrorist organizations and material 
support intended to further specific acts of terrorism (e.g., 
section 2339A versus 2339B of Title 18). An example of 
specific aid is an individual who provides blasting caps to a 
terrorist knowing that the terrorist is planning to blow up a 
U.S. Embassy. Generalized assistance, on the other hand, 
would be an individual giving false passports without any 
knowledge of specific, planned acts of terrorism to an 
organization that purports to be a charitable organization, but 
has been designated as an FTO where the donor knows the 
FTO status of the organization. In the context of military 
commission jurisdiction, those providing generalized 
assistance should not be on the same level as those intending 
to support specific acts of terrorism; and thus they should not 
                                                          
136
  See Newton, supra note 133 (―[I]t is entirely permissible for 
military commissions to coexist with other courts and to share concurrent 
jurisdiction. Thus, despite potential friction with the President's political 
base, ending military commissions or further limiting their flexibility runs 
the risk of eroding their utility for future Commanders-in-Chief to the 
legal and logical vanishing point. President Obama's decisions in the near 
future will be made on policy grounds rather than on the basis of legal 
necessity.‖). 
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be prosecuted in military commissions, but rather in federal 
courts.  
There are two reasons for this distinction. First, those 
intending to aid and having knowledge of (or if they should 
reasonably know of) specific acts of terrorism seem to fit 
better in a category with other crimes of terrorism. The donor 
shares the intention of doing harm to others (or to property, 
etc.) on the same specific level as those planning and 
committing the acts of terrorism. In this way, there is much 
more of a direct link between the supporter and the terrorist. 
The second reason for the distinction is that there are greater 
immediate security concerns when an individual gives 
material support to further a specific act of terrorism. It seems 
more likely that the given support will actually be used to 
commit an act of terrorism, and will be used sooner. 
Conversely, generalized support crimes still present some 
dangers and certainly need to be prosecuted, but this can be 
done in federal court. 
2. Active Theaters of War vs. Peace Zones 
In active theaters of war (i.e., Iraq or Afghanistan), the 
use of military commissions seems more justifiable, even for 
prosecuting material support crimes, especially considering 
the changes made in the 2009 MCA. In an active theater of 
war, such immediate security concerns extend to generalized 
aid as well because it seems more likely that material support, 
whether generalized or specific, will actually end up 
supporting acts of terrorism within a war zone because of the 
chaotic and lawless nature of such an area. Certainly 
individuals in war zones may or may not be intending to 
support specific acts of terrorism (and thus may not be as 
culpable), but the risk that the aid will actually end up 
supporting terrorists seems sufficiently great to warrant 
prosecution by military commission. Military commanders in 
war zones should have this option to prosecute those 
supporting terrorist acts within their areas of responsibility. 
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B. Military Commissions Are a Sensible Option 
Military commissions have a controversial history, but 
they have changed significantly in the past few years.
137
 In 
their current state, military commissions seem to be a sensible 
alternative to federal criminal trials to address situations 
where there are significant national security concerns.
138
 This 
section details a number of important changes made by the 
2009 MCA that make today‘s military commissions a fair 
forum. They are: limited jurisdiction (although as discussed 
this should be limited further for material support crimes),
139
 
allowance of pro se or self-selected civilian representation,
140
 
default application of the trial procedures and evidentiary 
rules of U.S. courts-martial,
141
 restricted use of hearsay 
evidence,
142
 imposition of a ―Brady‖ type disclosure duty on 
the prosecution,
143
 disallowance of statements produced by 
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment,
144
 
inclusion of classified information procedures nearly identical 
to those used in federal courts,
 145
 and finally, full appellate 
review by both military and federal courts.
146
 
1. Circumscribed Jurisdiction 
 Military commissions only have jurisdiction over 
―unprivileged enemy belligerents‖.
147
 Importantly, the 2009 
                                                          
137
  Padmanabhan, supra note 4, at 470-71. 
138
  Id. 
139
  10 U.S.C. § 948d (2009). 
140
  10 U.S.C. § 949c(3) (2009). 
141
  10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2009). 
142
  10 U.S.C. § 949a (2009). 
143
  10 U.S.C. § 949j(b)(2) (2009). 
144
  10 U.S.C. § 949r(a) (2009). 
145
  10 U.S.C. §§ 949p-1 to 949p-7 (2009). 
146
  10 U.S.C. §§ 950a-950j (2009). 
147
  10 U.S.C. § 948c (2009). The 2009 MCA immunizes U.S. 
citizens from prosecution by military commission. 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a(1), 
948c. It also invokes the definition of privileged enemy belligerents (i.e., 
lawful combatants) in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War. Thus anyone falling under the relevant 
definitions will automatically be excluded from military commissions and 
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MCA specifies that military commissions have the power to 
determine whether the accused is an unprivileged enemy 
belligerent for the purposes of prosecution by military 
commission.
148
 Previously, the 2006 MCA mandated that a 
determination of combatant status (a/k/a enemy belligerent 
status) by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (hereinafter 
―CSRT‖), which is tasked with deciding whether detainees at 
Guantanamo and other military installations are in fact enemy 
combatants, be dispositive for the purposes of military 
commission jurisdiction.
149
 This clause has been removed 
from the 2009 MCA.
150
 Although using CSRT determinations 
in military commissions is not explicitly banned by the 2009 
MCA, it appears that the presiding military judge now has the 
final say on whether the military commission has jurisdiction 
over the accused, much like Article III courts.
151
 This 
provision, in combination with the independence given to 
military commission judges in the 2006 MCA, constitutes a 
powerful check on Executive power, especially the power of 
CSRTs. 
2. Pro Se or Self-Selected Civilian Representation
152
 
The accused has the right to self-representation as long as 
he or she conforms to the applicable procedures and rules of 
the military commission.
153
 The accused is also entitled to 
choose his or her own civilian counsel, but it must be at no 
cost to the government.
154
 If the charge is capital, whether the 
accused is representing him or herself, has his or her own 
counsel, or is represented by a military lawyer, the accused 
                                                                                                                       
must be tried by court-martial. See, 10 U.S.C. § 948(a) (2009); Glazier, 
supra note 130, at 998-1000. 
148
  10 U.S.C. § 948d (2009). 
149
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 §§ 
948d(c), 120 Stat. 2603 (2006). 
150
  10 U.S.C. § 948d (2009). 
151
  Id. 
152
  10 U.S.C. § 949c (2009). 
153
  10 U.S.C. §§ 949a(b)(2)(D), 949a(b)(4) (2009). 
154
  10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(C)(i) (2009). 
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has the right to a lawyer that is experienced with capital cases 
(and this lawyer may be a civilian).
155
 
3. Court-Martial Trial and Evidence Rules are Default for 
Military Commissions 
The 2009 MCA has changed the default application of the 
trial procedures and rules of evidence for Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (hereinafter ―UCMJ‖), which are used in 
United States courts-martial (which are where criminal trials 
for members of the armed forces are held).
156
 Previously, the 
UCMJ only applied if it was specifically invoked in the 
MCA.
157
 The 2006 MCA stated that [the] procedures 
[promulgated by the Secretary of Defense] shall, so far as the 
Secretary considers practicable or consistent with military or 
intelligence activities, apply the principles of law and the 
rules of evidence in trial by general courts-martial.‖
158
 Now, 
the UCMJ applies by default, unless a statute or Secretary of 
Defense specifies otherwise (of course the Secretary may not 
deviate from the limits set by law).
159
  Thus, where the MCA 
or Secretary of Defense by way of the Manual for Military 
Commissions does not specify a rule, the rules of courts-
martial will be controlling. 
4. Further Restrictions on Hearsay 
At a minimum, the 2009 MCA requires the suppression of 
evidence if its probative value is ―substantially outweighed‖ 
by a risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading 
the members, undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.
160
 Under the 2006 
MCA, this was an optional provision that the Secretary of 
                                                          
155
  Id. 
156
  10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2009). 
157
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 §§ 
948b(c)-948b(d), 949a(a), 120 Stat. 2602, 2608 (2006). 
158
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No, 109-366 § 
949a(a), 120 Stat. 2608 (2006). 
159
  10 U.S.C. § 949a(a) (2009). 
160
  10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(F) (2009). 
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Defense could choose to adopt when formulating rules of 
evidence.
161
 Like the 2006 MCA, the 2009 MCA gives a list 
of provisions that the Secretary of Defense may choose to 
adopt in the rules of evidence.
162
 However, a new Manual for 
Military Commissions, which contains the rules of evidence 
for military commissions, has not been published yet. 
Even the baseline statutory protection in the 2009 MCA is 
a significant improvement over the 2006 MCA. Under the 
2006 MCA, hearsay evidence was not presumptively 
inadmissible as it is in the Military Rules of Evidence and 
Federal Rules of Evidence.
163
 Rather, it was presumptively 
admissible.
164
 Hearsay was allowed to be admitted under one 
of the traditional exceptions contained in the Military Rules 
of Evidence and Federal Rule of Evidence.
165
 More 
significantly, however, hearsay could be admitted if adequate 
notice was provided to the opposing party and that party 
could not demonstrate the unreliability of the proffered 
evidence by a preponderance of the evidence.
166
 In other 
words, if the prosecution provided timely notice to the 
defense that it was going to introduce hearsay evidence, the 
defense was given the burden to prove the unreliability of the 
evidence.
167
 This was a rather significant loophole, and 
fortunately Congress did not include it in the 2009 MCA.  




The 2009 MCA enhances the right of the accused to 
discovery by requiring the prosecutor to disclose any 
evidence which ―reasonably tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused . . . reduce the degree of guilt of the accused . . . 
                                                          
161
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 § 
949a(b)(2), 120 Stat. 2608 (2006). 
162
  10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(3) (2009). 
163
  Military Commission Rule of Evidence 803(a)-(b) (2006). 
164
  Id. 
165
  Military Commission Rule of Evidence 803(a) (2006). 
166
  Military Commission Rule of Evidence 803(a)-(b). 
167
  Id. 
168
  Padmanabhan, supra note 4, at 471. 
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impeach the credibility of [government witnesses, or] . . . 
mitigat[e] evidence at sentencing.‖
169
 The key aspect of this 
provision is that it requires the prosecutor to turn over any 
evidence that ―is known or reasonably should be known to 
any government officials who participated in the 
investigation and prosecution of the case against the 
defendant.‖
170
 This rule is very similar to the Brady rule 
applicable in federal courts, which also requires prosecutors 
to turn over any exculpatory evidence of which the 
prosecutor knows or reasonably should know.
171
 On the topic 
of obtaining evidence, this same section in the 2009 MCA 
also specifies that the right of the accused in a military 
commission to obtain witnesses and evidence in his defense 
is equal to the right that a defendant in an Article III court has 
to obtain witnesses and evidence for his defense.
172
 
6. Prohibition on Statements Obtained by Torture or Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 
 The scope of the ban on statements obtained by torture 
has been expanded in the 2009 MCA to include statements 
produced by cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (as 
defined in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)).
 173
 
The Army Field Manual, the only source which military 
personnel may rely on for standards of conduct in 
interrogations,
174
 prohibits a multitude of actions such as: 
―[f]orcing the detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts, or 
pose in a sexual manner, [p]lacing hoods or sacks over the 
head of a detainee; using duct tape over the eyes, [a]pplying 
                                                          
169
  10 U.S.C. § 949j (2009).  
170
  10 U.S.C. § 949j(b)(4) (2009). 
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  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Bennett L. 
Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 
699-700 (2006).  
172
  10 U.S.C. § 949j(a)(1) (2009). 
173
  10 U.S.C. § 948r(a) (2006). 
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  Executive Order, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, § 3(c) (Jan. 22, 
2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogatio
ns/; See also John R. Cook, President Issues Executive Order Banning 
Torture and CIA Prisons, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 331 (2009). 
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beatings, electric shock, burns, or other forms of physical 
pain, ―[w]aterboarding,‖ [u]sing military working dogs, 
[i]nducing hypothermia or heat injury, [c]onducting mock 
executions, [and] [d]epriving the detainee of necessary food, 
water, or medical care.‖
175
  
The 2006 MCA banned statements produced by torture, 
but allowed statements obtained by other means before the 
enactment of the DTA if they met a two-part standard: ―(1) 
the totality of the circumstances render[ed] the statement 
reliable and possessing sufficient probative value; and (2) the 
interests of justice would [have] best [been] served by 
admission of the statement into evidence.‖
176
 However, 
statements obtained after the enactment of the DTA were also 
not allowed if they were obtained by cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment.
177
 This is significant because a great 
deal of inappropriate detainee treatment by the CIA occurred 
between 2002 and 2004.
178
 The 2009 MCA amendment 
forecloses the use of any statements obtained by improper 
methods during that time period.
179
 
 The 2009 MCA also imposes additional standards on 
other statements introduced into evidence. Like the 2006 
MCA, such statements must be found reliable as judged by 
the totality of the circumstances and must have sufficient 
probative value.
180
 Second, either the statement (1) must be 
made incident to lawful conduct during military operations 
and (2) its introduction would best serve the interests of 
justice; or the statement must be voluntarily made.
181
 The 
voluntariness of the statement is to be judged by ―the totality 
of the circumstances, including, as appropriate:‖ (1) the 
                                                          
175
  U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3, §5-75. 
176
  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 § 
948r(c), 120 Stat. 2607 (2006). 
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  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366  § 
948r(d) , 120 Stat. 2607 (2006). 
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details and circumstances of military and intelligence conduct 
surrounding the taking of the statement, ―(2) the 
characteristics of the accused, such as military training, age, 
and education level,‖ and (3) other circumstances 
surrounding the taking of the statement such as ―lapse of 
time, change of place, or change in identity‖ of the 
interrogator between the time the statement was taken and 
any prior questioning.
182
 This provision allows, but does not 
require, the judge to consider all the surrounding 
circumstances of the taking of a statement to make sure the 




7. Classified Information Procedures Are Nearly Identical to 
CIPA 
A significant change in the 2009 MCA is the near-
complete incorporation of the Classified Information 
Procedures Act (hereinafter ―CIPA‖), the federal law 
mandating certain procedures to handle classified information 
in federal criminal trials.
184
 By ―establish[ing] a procedural 
framework for ruling on questions of admissibility involving 
classified information before introduction of the evidence in 
open court,‖ CIPA helps ease the tension between a 
defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and the 
government‘s interest in protecting classified information.
185
 
The 2009 MCA essentially incorporates CIPA in its entirety 
(hereinafter ―MCIPA‖);
186
 however Congress made a few 
modifications, likely because of the increased sensitivity of 
information and security concerns in military commissions. 
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  10 U.S.C. § 948r(d) (2009). 
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  Jonathan M. Lamb, Comment, The Muted Rise of the Silent 
Witness Rule in National Security Litigation: The Eastern District of 
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CIPA has four main provisions.
187
 First, either party may 
move for, and the court is required to hold, a pretrial 
conference to consider and encourage resolution of questions 
about the use of classified information.
188
 In the conference, 
no decisions are made about the proposed use of classified 
information at trial, but the court may issue a protective order 
prohibiting the defense from disclosing any classified 
information it may receive.
189
 The language in MCIPA on 
pretrial conferences and protective orders is identical to that 
of CIPA, except that MCIPA has been expanded to allow for 
ex parte pretrial conferences.
190
 
The second aspect concerns discovery. When the defense 
requests discovery of or access to classified information in a 
federal criminal trial, CIPA allows the U.S. to make a motion 
to the judge to obtain authorization to redact information 
from, substitute a summary for, or stipulate to facts contained 
in the classified information.
191
 MCIPA, on the other hand, 
disallows the disclosure of classified information by default 
unless the judge determines that disclosure ―would be 
noncumulative, relevant, and helpful to a legally cognizable 
defense, rebuttal of the prosecution‘s case, or to sentencing, 
in accordance with standards generally applicable to 
discovery of or access to classified information in Federal 
criminal cases.‖
192
 The difference, while material, seems 
unlikely to substantially impact fairness because while 
MCIPA does provide for a default rule against disclosure of 
classified information, it also gives the military judge 
significant discretion. It also provides concrete standards for 
judges to work with, standards that are based on federal 
criminal standards and procedure.
193
 Additionally, however, 
MCIPA does not allow the defense to move for 
reconsideration if the military judge prevents access or 
authorizes a substitution, summarization, or redaction request 
                                                          
187
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  Id. at 239-40. 
189
  Id. 
190
  10 U.S.C. § 949p-2(b) (2009); 18A U.S.C. § 2. 
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by the prosecution.
194
 The remainder of this MCIPA 
provision provides more specific wording, but appears to 
operate in the same manner as CIPA.
195
 
The third provision of CIPA concerning the defendant‘s 
pre-existing knowledge of classified information is identical 
to the corresponding provision of MCIPA. In both statutes, 
where the accused already has knowledge of classified 
information, or gains access to such knowledge during the 
pre-trial or trial stage, the accused is required to notify the 
court if it intends to disclose the information.
196
 The United 
States must then be given a ―reasonable opportunity‖ to seek 
a hearing to consider a substitution of the classified 
information, as explained in the next paragraph.
197
 
Section 6 of CIPA is the principal provision of the 
classified information procedures regime.
198
 It lays out the 
procedures to be followed when a judge determines the 
proper use of classified information at trial.
199
 At a section 6 
hearing, the judge first determines whether the proffered 
information is relevant and admissible at trial (as would be 
done for any other evidence).
200
 This hearing can be held in 
camera if the Attorney General (or a ―knowledgeable U.S. 
official‖ in the case of military commissions) certifies that a 
public hearing might result in disclosure of the 
information.
201
 To assure that classified information is not 
unnecessarily disclosed in military commissions, Congress 
inserted the following into MCIPA: ―Classified information 
is not subject to disclosure under this section unless the 
information is relevant and necessary to an element of the 
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In the case that the judge authorizes disclosure of 
classified information, the government may seek permission 
to submit a summary of the classified information or a 
statement admitting relevant facts that the classified 
information tends to prove in lieu of the classified 
information.
203
 In this ―substitution hearing‖ authorized by 
section 6(c) the judge has a responsibility to the defendant to 
ensure that any substitutions or statements provided by the 
government ―will provide the defendant with substantially the 




If the judge orders disclosure after a substitution hearing, 
then the Attorney General may object to the order by filing an 
affidavit certifying that the disclosure of the information 
would damage national security.
205
 The government may 
ultimately choose not to disclose the information, but the 
judge is then authorized to dismiss specific counts, the entire 
case, or strike the testimony of a government witness.
206
 
Most of section 6 of MCIPA mirrors CIPA, but some 
language is carried over from the 2006 MCA. First, § 949p-
6(c) mandates an in camera pretrial hearing to assess the 
admissibility of classified information. It also helps protect 
unnecessary disclosure of classified information by requiring 
that the judge permit the trial counsel to  
 
Includ[e] a substituted evidentiary foundation 
pursuant to the procedures described in 
subsection (d) [MCIPA subsection (d) is the 
counterpart of CIPA section 6(c), which 
allows for substitution, etc.], while protecting 
from disclosure information identifying those 
sources, methods, or activities, if (A) the 
evidence is otherwise admissible; and (B) the 
military judge finds that (i) the evidence is 
                                                          
203
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reliable; and (ii) the redaction is consistent 
with affording the accused a fair trial.
207
 
8. Full Appellate Review via Military and Federal Courts 
The 2009 MCA has changed appellate review of military 
commissions in two very important ways. First, the scope of 
review for the CMCR and D.C. Circuit has been expanded.
 208
 
Both courts may now review findings of both law and fact.
209
 
Thus, the CMCR may find that the evidence against the 
accused was insufficient to support the jury verdict.
210
 
Second, the 2009 MCA has given CMCR judges full 
independence from improper influence by the executive 
branch and chain of command.
211
 This structure follows the 
court-martial scheme, which provides for trial and review by 
independent military judges, then the review continues on 
into the Article III courts.
212
 
This system is advantageous in two respects. First, by 
allowing independent military judges to conduct trials and the 
first layer of appellate review, it allows them to tailor 
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constitutional and statutory interpretation to the unique 
demands of military circumstances.
213
 Second, this system 
more fully tests the procedural, substantive, and 
constitutional validity of the trials and statutes by providing 
for at least two layers of detailed review to expose the 
weaknesses and unfair aspects of a particular statute or trial. 
In addition, military commission judges and CMCR 
judges should be able to incorporate findings of federal courts 
on federal material support statutes and trials and similar 
findings of military courts-martial into military commissions 




Overall, this system places a great deal of faith in military 
judges and lawyers, but rightly so. We cannot assume that 
these judges and lawyers will give in to executive demands or 
ignore their ethical and professional obligations in order to 
secure unfair or unwarranted convictions.
215
 As one 
commentator said:  
The practice of military commissions during 
the past seven years demonstrates that military 
attorneys and judges have done their duty in 
seeking justice according to law. Many human 
rights groups and lay observers unfamiliar 
with the discipline and dedication of military 
attorneys assumed that they would simply 
cave in to executive pressures to unfairly 
convict defendants with little due process. The 
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IV. IMPROVING THE PERCEPTION OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
TO GAIN SUPPORT 
In addition to guiding the Executive and limiting 
unneeded discretion, a clear standard for the separation 
between federal courts and military commissions will help 
give the U.S. credibility abroad. Such credibility is badly 
needed to obtain support from other countries in fighting 
terrorism. These countries need to know about the changes 
that have been made to military commissions, and that we are 
using them in a judicious manner. If we can get that message 
across, it seems more likely that other countries will 
cooperate because they know we value fairness, due process, 
and other similar values. 
The U.S. can and should act in other ways such as using 
multilateral treaties and law enforcement agreements to 
encourage the enforcement of anti-terrorism (and material 
support) laws by other countries. The U.S. should also come 
up with ways to educate our own population and the 
populations of other countries on extremism and terrorism 
and combat such ideologies. By engaging Arab and Muslim 
communities at home and abroad diplomatically and 
respectfully, we can also obtain the intelligence and 
information we need to ferret out terrorist threats.
217
 By 
increasing emphasis on multilateral political and diplomatic 





The military commissions introduced by President Bush 
in 2001 were heavily criticized by many,
 
but they have come 
a long way since then. The 2006 MCA and 2009 MCA have 
made significantly changed military commissions and 
provided many fundamental procedural protections for the 
accused.  
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In light of the 2009 MCA, this note asserts that military 
commissions now constitute a fair and sensible forum for 
prosecuting terrorists. To address the criticism that there is no 
clear dividing line between the jurisdiction of military 
commissions and federal courts, this note proposes limiting 
the jurisdiction of military commissions over material support 
crimes to individuals who intend to further specific acts of 
terrorism (and have actual knowledge, or should reasonably 
know of a specific act of terrorism) in any area of the world 
and to those giving generalized or specific aid to terrorists or 
FTOs in active theaters of war. This approach, while not 
perfect, provides a relatively clear dividing line. In addition, 
having a clear jurisdictional separation between military 
commissions and federal courts will bolster the credibility of 
the U.S. abroad, and substantially increase the support we 
receive from other countries in fighting terrorism. 
